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Problems of legislative omission 
in constitutional jurisprudence 
 
 
1. The Romanian scientific legal doctrine does not treat separately the 
problematic of legal gaps. Having researched the doctrine for a proper 
answer to the Questionnaire proposed for the XIVth Congress of the 
Conference of European Constitutional Courts I could not identify any work 
which main subject matter are the problems of legislative omission. The 
topic is approached tangentially in the works concerning legislative 
technique, especially as concerns the moment when a normative act is 
repealed. We quote a comment in this respect, from a work of legislative 
technique published in 1996. 
 
“We should start from the idea that if nature abhors vacuum, human society 
should abhor legislative vacuum. Sometimes, the repealing (of a normative 
act) is pure and simple; it repeals normative acts without necessarily 
replacing them with other regulations. This is the situation where there is no 
need to settle certain issues. 
 
Nevertheless, in most cases, the laws succeed one another. In the period 
between the moment when a law is repealed and the moment when another 
text is enacted we deal with a legislative gap. 
 
Such gaps attract anarchy. Social relationships are out of the control of the 
law, and they can develop chaotically contrary to the interests of the society. 
That is why we must avoid gaps, a normative act should be repealed only if 
there is a text to replace it.”1 
 
In the same order of ideas, Prof. Ioan Vida mentions in his treaty of formal 
legistics that “the enactment of new legal norms aims to cover legal gaps, to 
replace present norms, to supplement or to amend such norms”, and that, in 
                                                 
1 Prof. Dr. Victor Dan Zlătescu: Introduction in formal legistics. Legislative technique. OSCAR PRINT 
Publishing House, 1996, pg.91. 
case of repealing of a normative act and replacement thereof with another 
normative act, “the two moments must be concomitant in order to avoid the 
occurrence of certain antinomies or legislative gaps dictated by the delay 
between the enactment and repealing of the two normative acts.”2  
 
Yet, the concept of legislative gap frequently appears in the speech of 
politicians and in the media, when they militate for the settling by law of 
a certain area of activity or when they claim the absence of certain 
social relationships. 
 
Likewise, the concept of legislative gap sometimes appears in the acts of 
the Government or of the public authorities, in the phase of initiation or 
adoption of certain legal acts of normative type, as a reason for the adoption 
of the concerned regulation. An example in this respect can be found in the 
Fundamentation Note of the Government Decision no.1439/2004 concerning 
the specialised services destined to children who have committed an offence, 
but are not criminally responsible, of which, though others, are pointed out 
the followings:  
 
“As concerns the minors who have committed an offence under the criminal 
law, but who are not criminally responsible, Romanian legislation has 
encountered a real legislative gap until the adoption of the Law no.272/2004 
on the protection and promotion of children rights. 
 
Thus, the Criminal Code only settled the regime of penalties for minors who 
are criminally responsible, and the provisions concerning the protection 
measures which could be applied in case of these minors, comprised under 
Chapter III of Government Urgency Ordinance no.26/1997 concerning the 
special protection of the child in difficulty, were declared unconstitutional 
through Decision no.47/1999 of the Constitutional Court. By the enactment 
of Law no.272/2004 on the protection and promotion of children rights, this 
legislative gap was covered, within Chapter IV, through Articles 80 to 84, 
being settled “Protection of the children who have committed an offence 
under the criminal law, but are not criminally responsible”. The same 
normative act states that “during the entire duration of the application of the 
measures destined to children who have committed an offence under 
criminal law, but are not criminally responsible, specialised services shall be 
                                                 
2 Prof. Dr. Ioan Vida, Formal legistics, Introduction in the legislative procedure and technique, 2nd Edition 
revised and supplemented, LUMINA LEX Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, pg 184-193. 
assured in order to assist the children in the process of reintegration into the 
society”. In this order of ideas, the decision aims to settle the constitution, 
organisation and functioning of specialised services destined to children who 
have committed an offence, but are not criminally responsible.” 
 
In the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Romania, the 
concepts of legislative gap and legislative omission have been used, up to 
this moment, in two categories of decisions: a) decisions by which the 
legislative gap has been invoked as a reason for declaring the 
unconstitutionality of certain legal provisions; b) decisions by which the 
Court has ascertained the inadmissibility of certain objections of 
unconstitutionality invoking the existence of certain legislative omissions 
which purpose was the supplementation of these normative acts, with the 
provisions wanted by the authors of the objection. Thus: 
 
a) Through Decision no.62 of 8 January 2007 of the Constitutional Court, 
the Law no.278/2006 repealing the offences of insult and the calumny from 
the Criminal Code was declared unconstitutional. As grounds for this 
decision were held, through others, the following reasons: 
 
“The legal object of the offences of insult and calumny, provided by Article 
205 and, respectively, Article 206 of the Criminal Code, is the dignity of the 
person, his/her reputation and honour.  
 
The active subject of the analysed offences is not circumstantiated, and the 
commitment thereof can be performed directly, through speech, through 
texts published in the written press or though means of audiovisual 
communication. Regardless of the manner in which such offences are 
committed and of the quality of the persons committing such offences – mere 
citizens, political figures, journalists and so on -, the actions that constitute 
these offences severely infringe human personality, dignity, honour and 
reputation of those attacked in this way. If such actions were not 
discouraged by means of the criminal law, they would lead to the de facto 
reaction of those offended and to permanent disputes, which would render 
impossible the social cohabitation, which implies respect towards each 
member of the community and equal appreciation of each one’s reputation. 
That is why, the mentioned values, protected by the Criminal Code, have a 
constitutional statute, human dignity being enshrined through Article 1 
paragraph (3) of the Constitution of Romania as one of the supreme values. 
Thus, the quoted text of the Basic Law provides that "Romania is a 
democratic and social state governed by the rule of law, in which human 
dignity, the citizens' rights and freedoms, the free development of human 
personality, justice and political pluralism represent supreme values, in 
the spirit of the Romanian people's democratic traditions and the ideals 
embodied by the December 1989 Revolution, and shall be guaranteed". 
 
Taking into account the outstanding importance of the values enshrined by 
the provisions of Articles 205, 206 and 207 of the Criminal Code, the 
Constitutional Court finds that the repealing of these legal texts and the 
decriminalization, in this way, of the crimes of insult and calumny, 
contravene the provisions of Article 1 paragraph (3) of the Constitution of 
Romania. 
 
In the same respect, the Court holds that, by the repealing of the mentioned 
legal provisions was created an inadmissible legislative lacuna, contrary to 
the constitutional provision that guarantees human dignity as a supreme 
value. In absence of the legal protection provided by Articles 205, 206 and 
207 of the Criminal Code, human dignity, honour and reputation do not 
benefit of any other form of real and adequate legal protection. 
 
- Through Decision no.349 of December 19th 2001 the Constitutional Court 
ascertained that the provisions under Article 54 paragraph 2 of the Family 
Code are unconstitutional to the extent in which they only acknowledge the 
father’s, and not also the mother’s and the child’s born in wedlock right to 
commence an action to disclaim paternity. 
 
The text of the Family Code, further declared unconstitutional, stipulated 
that the action to disclaim paternity can be commenced only by the husband 
of the mother of the child born in wedlock. As grounds for this decision the 
Court mentioned, through other things, the following reasons: 
 
“The enshrining, through the provisions of Article 54 paragraph 2 under the 
Family Code, of the right to contest the presumed paternity only in favour of 
the presumed father, excluding the mother and the child born in wedlock, 
equally entitled to the legitimate interest to promote such action, represents 
an infringement of the principle of equal rights provided by Article 16 of the 
Constitution. 
Likewise, the provisions under Article 54 of the Family Code, to the extent in 
which they refuse the acknowledgement for the mother of the right to 
disclaim the presumed paternity, contravene also the provisions under 
Article 44 paragraph (1) of the Constitution which enshrines the equality 
between spouses as one of the principles on which the family institution is 
based on. 
The Court also holds that the text impugned contravenes also paragraph 2 
of Article 26 of the Constitution, to the extent in which it does not 
acknowledge also the child’s right to contest the presumed paternity, 
circumstance meant to impose him/her a certain legal status established 
through somebody else’s will, which he/she must accept passively, without 
being able to take action for the modification thereof, which can only 
represent a denial of the right acknowledged for each and every natural 
person, through the constitutional article abovementioned, to freely dispose 
of himself/herself. 
 
The Court considers that the acknowledgement, in favour of the child, of the 
right to contest the presumed paternity, as an expression of the 
constitutional right of each and every person to freely dispose of 
himself/herself, does not encroach upon the rights and freedoms of others, 
on public order, or morals, and, therefore, it finds no justification for the 
infringement of the constitutional provision.  
 
Therefore, the non acknowledgement, as concerns the child, of the right to 
establish his/her own affiliation towards father, in concordance with the 
reality, against a fiction, right acknowledged though to the presumed father, 
represents an obvious breach of the constitutional text.” 
 
This is a decision by which the Court clearly censors a legislative omission – 
that of acknowledging the right of the mother and of the child born in 
wedlock to contest the paternity established by law for the husband of the 
mother – finding that it infringes the norms and the principles of the 
Constitution. 
 
We should mention that this decision was adopted with majority vote of the 
members of the Constitutional Court and that two of the Judges have made 
dissenting opinion, considering that by ascertaining the legislative gap, the 
Court went beyond its competence.  
 
b) The Constitutional Court constantly rejects as inadmissible the objections 
of unconstitutionality where, by claiming that a legal provision does not 
include the content desired by the authors of the objection, the purpose is to 
amend the law according to the authors’ purposes. The Court’s argument in 
such cases is that, by its nature, it is not a positive legislator and that only the 
legislative body is competent to adopt, amend or supplement the laws, 
invoking in this respect the provisions under Article 2 paragraph (3) of the 
Law no,47/1992 on the organisation and functioning of the Constitutional 
Court, according to which: “The Constitutional Court shall adjudicate only 
on the constitutionality of the acts which it has been referred, and shall not 
be competent to modify or to supplement the provisions under review.” We 
quote, as examples, some decision of the Court, aleatorily chosen from the 
2005 jurisprudence. 
-Through Decision no.449 of September 15th 2005 was rejected as 
inadmissible the objection of unconstitutionality of the Law no.19/2000 on 
public pensions system and other social security rights, challenging the fact 
that pensions were increased with too low amounts. As grounds for this 
decision was held, through other things, that: “There is no legal provision 
that may entitle the Constitutional Court to ask the Parliament to amend 
certain legal texts, because this would infringe upon the principle of 
separation of powers. Likewise, pursuant Article 2 paragraph (3) of the Law 
no.47/1992, the court of contentious cannot amend or supplement the 
provisions submitted to constitutional review”. 
-Through Decision no.447 of September 15th 2005 was rejected as 
inadmissible the objection of unconstitutionality formulated by several 
judges and public prosecutors against the provisions of Article 28 of 
Government Urgency Ordinance no.43/2002 on the National Anticorruption 
Department, according to which the magistrates who participate to the 
settlement of corruption crimes shall be granted an increase of 40% of the 
monthly emolument. The authors of the objection claimed that the legal 
provisions impugned contravene the constitutional principle of equal rights 
and that of such increase of the monthly emolument should benefit all 
magistrates, irrespective of the type of cases they settle. The Court held in its 
decision that as the authors of the objection intended to supplement the legal 
text, and pursuant Article 61 paragraph (1) of the Constitution, the 
Parliament is the sole legislative authority of the country, the Constitutional 
Court is not competent to remediate the invoked legal omission. 
-Through Decision no.624 of November 17th 2005 the Constitutional Court 
has rejected for the same reasons the objection of unconstitutionality of the 
provisions under Article 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, according 
to which, the court’s referral act (indictment) shall be communicated to 
indicted persons in detention, finding that, as grounds for the objection, its 
author claimed that the legal text impugned should provide the 
communication of the court’s referral act to all categories of indicted 
persons, irrespective of the fact that they are being tried without being 
detained or they are being tried while in detention on remand. 
 
2. In the Romanian legal system, the Constitution has supreme legal force, 
and the observance of the Constitution is mandatory for all public authorities 
– inclusively for Parliament as legislative body – and for all the other law 
subjects, legal or natural persons. 
 
The Constitution is thus the basic law, superordinated to all other normative 
acts of general type, which are the laws for the revisions of the Constitution, 
the organic laws, the ordinary laws, the Government Urgency Ordinances 
and Ordinances issued by Government in basis of the legislative delegation 
granted through authorization laws. 
 
Treaties ratified by Parliament are also part of the domestic law. According 
to Article 11 paragraph (3) of the Constitution of Romania, “where a treaty 
to which Romania is to become party comprises provisions contrary to the 
Constitution, ratification shall only be possible after a constitutional 
revision”. 
 
As concerns the relation between the Constitution of Romania and the 
international legal acts to which Romania is party, Article 20 of the 
Constitution provides the following: 
 
“(1) The constitutional provisions relative to the citizens' rights and 
freedoms shall be interpreted and applied in conformity with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, with the covenants and other treaties to which 
Romania is a party.  
(2) Where inconsistency exists between the covenants and treaties on 
fundamental human rights to which Romania is a party, and national law, 
the international regulations shall prevail except where the Constitution or 
domestic laws comprise more favourable provisions.”  
 
3. The Constitutional Court of Romania is not competent to review 
legislative gaps, legislative omissions or inconsistencies between different 
laws or within the same law. 
According to Article 146 of the Constitution of Romania, the Constitutional 
Court has the following powers of constitutional review over normative 
legal acts of general type: 
a) it adjudicates on the constitutionality of laws before promulgation, upon 
referral by the President of Romania, the President of either of the 
Chambers, the Government, the High Court of Cassation and Justice, the 
Advocate of the People, at least 50 Deputies or at least 25 Senators, as well 
as ex officio, on any initiative purporting a revision of the Constitution;  
b) it adjudicates on the constitutionality of treaties or other international 
agreements, upon referral by the President of either of the Chambers, at least 
50 Deputies or at least 25 Senators;  
c) it adjudicates on the constitutionality of the Standing Orders of Parliament 
upon referral by the President of either of the Chambers, a parliamentary 
group or at least 50 Deputies or at least 25 Senators;  
d) it rules upon objections as to the unconstitutionality of laws and 
ordinances which are raised before the courts of law or commercial 
arbitration; a plea of unconstitutionality may also be brought up directly by 
the Advocate of the People;  
As concerns the effects of the decisions of the Constitutional Court, Article 
147 of the Constitution of Romania provides as follows: 
“(1) Any provisions of the laws and ordinances in force, as well as any of 
the regulations which are held as unconstitutional, shall cease their legal 
effects within 45 days from publication of the decision rendered by the 
Constitutional Court where Parliament or Government, as may be 
applicable, have failed, in the meantime, to bring these unconstitutional 
provisions into accord with those of the Constitution. For this limited length 
of time the provisions declared unconstitutional shall be suspended as of 
right.  
(2) In cases related to laws declared unconstitutional before their 
promulgation, Parliament must reconsider those provisions concerned in 
order to bring such into line with the decision rendered by the Constitutional 
Court.  
(3) If a treaty or international agreement has been declared constitutional 
according to Article 146 subparagraph b), such may no longer be demurred 
against via an objection of unconstitutionality. Any treaty or international 
agreement held as unconstitutional cannot be ratified.  
(4) Decisions of the Constitutional Court shall be published in the Official 
Gazette of Romania. As from their publication, decisions shall be generally 
binding and take effect only for the future.”  
3. In our opinion, the legislative gap intervenes when the a desirable 
regulation is absent from legislation and such regulation is needed for 
carrying out social relationships in a certain area of existence of community 
or when a legal norm settling fundamental values enshrined by the 
Constitution is repealed without being replaced by another legal norm with 
the same purpose. In the first hypothesis, the Constitutional Court cannot 
intervene for the removal of the legislative gap, due to the fact that, as 
mentioned before, the subject matter of the constitutional review are the 
norms of positive law, in other words, the laws in force, and not a desirable 
but an inexistent legislation. The duty and competence on removing the 
legislative gaps comes in this case to the political factors and first of all to 
Parliament. In the second hypothesis, as can be noted from the comments to 
Decision no.62 of January 8th 2007, mentioned above, the Court may take 
action – further to its referral by the subjects provided by law – by 
ascertaining the unconstitutionality of the repealing which effect was the 
creation of a legislative gap infringing upon the norms and principles 
enshrined through the Constitution. 
 
In none of the cases may the legislative gap be generated by the decisions of 
the Constitutional Court ascertaining the inconsistency between the 
normative act subject to review and the provisions of the Constitution, with 
the effects provided by Article 147 of the Constitution, quoted above. Even 
in case Parliament would delay or would omit the bringing into line of the 
unconstitutional provisions with the provisions of the Constitution, this 
cannot be considered a legislative gap, because an unconstitutional legal 
norm, eliminated from legislation, is neither necessary nor desirable. In any 
case, the responsibility for possible negative consequences of delay in 
bringing into agreement the unconstitutional provisions with the 
Constitution belongs to the Parliament which, through its constitutional 
status, holds the monopoly of the legislative task. 
 
As concerns the legislative omissions, these may arise as a result of the non 
correlation of the provisions of different laws or as a result of the elliptical 
character of the terms of a regulation. Most times legislative omissions can 
be repaired only by the same legislative power, as in case of the omissions 
that have constituted the subject matter of the objections of 
unconstitutionality rejected as inadmissible. In other cases, when the law is 
not precise, the judge may apply directly the provision comprised in a text of 
the Constitution or when- as the case settled through the Constitutional 
Court Decision no.349 of 19 December 2001, presented above – not the 
legal text submitted to Court’s review is unconstitutional but a certain 
interpretation which can be given to this text, the Constitutional Court has 
the possibility to step in, upon referral, and to ascertain through an 
interpretative decision “to what extent” that text is unconstitutional. In these 
cases, the legal text under review is not removed from legislation but it is 
applied as established by the Constitutional Court. It is obvious that, also in 
this case, the Parliament should intervene, by reformulating the law, in order 
to make things clear. 
 
NOTE. Due to the specificity of the activity of the Constitutional Court of 
Romania, which deals with problems of legislative gaps and legislative 
omission to a very narrow extent, this work does not comprise answers to all 
questions from the Questionnaire nor does it follow the order in which these 
questions are formulated. Nevertheless, we hope that our work will be of 
help precisely through the specificity of our experience presented above. 
